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How the International Monetary Fund Saw Postwar 
Payments Problems  Edward M. Bernstein 
After prolonged discussions in  1943-44,  the United States and the United 
Kingdom, and the countries with which they consulted, were agreed that it 
was necessary to establish a permanent institution for cooperation on interna- 
tional monetary problems. In particular, they agreed on the need “to promote 
exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements . . . and to 
avoid competitive exchange depreciation” (Articles of  Agreement, Article 1 
[iii]). They were not agreed, however, on what the postwar problems would 
be, what would cause them, or how to deal with them. 
Depression or Inflation 
Some countries,  including the United Kingdom, believed that  the main 
cause of  postwar payments problems would be the recurrence of  the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. As a consequence, there would be widespread diffi- 
culty in financing balance of  payments deficits with the United States. In the 
introduction to his proposal for an International Clearing Union, Keynes said, 
“[We] need a means of reassurance to a troubled world, by which any country 
whose own affairs are conducted with due prudence is relieved of anxiety, for 
causes which are not of its making, concerning its ability to meet its interna- 
tional liabilities; and which will, therefore, make unnecessary those methods 
of restriction and discrimination which countries had adopted hitherto, not on 
Edward M.  Bernstein is a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution. He was chief technical 
adviser and executive secretary of the U.S. delegation at the Bretton Woods conference,  1944, 
and the director of research at the International Monetary Fund, 1946-58. 
495 496  Edward M. Bernstein 
their  merits,  but  as  measures  of  self-protection  from  disruptive  outside 
forces.” I 
The outside forces that Keynes had in mind were the Great Depression and 
the large payments surplus of the United States, on an official reserve basis, 
from 1934 to 1939. In a letter explaining the need for an International Clear- 
ing Union, Keynes wrote that “the necessity of some such plan as the above 
arises essentially from the unbalanced creditor position of the United States.”* 
The concern about the disruptive effects of  another great depression was met 
by the scarce currency provision of the Articles of Agreement of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund. This allowed countries to discriminate against a super- 
surplus country whose currency had become scarce in the Fund-that  is, a 
country whose surplus could not be financed by drawing its currency from the 
Fund. 
When I joined the staff of  the International Monetary Fund in June 1946, 
the managing director asked me to discuss this and other problems with the 
executive directors. I told them that there would be a need for large resources 
for reconstruction and consequently pressure on the balance of payments of 
Europe for several years but that there would not be a great depression. The 
Great Depression after World War I was caused by the interaction of wartime 
inflation and the gold standard. The inflation exhausted the money-creating 
power of  a gold standard world, and, because of  the uneven  inflation, the 
historical gold parities could no longer maintain balance in international pay- 
ments without persistent deflation in some countries to bring down costs. The 
Bretton Woods system differed from the gold standard in an important respect. 
Although the Fund was designed to maintain stable exchange rates, the par 
value of a currency could be changed if that was necessary to correct a mal- 
adjustment in a member’s balance of  payments without resorting to deflation 
or exchange restrictions. 
I told the executive directors that, instead of depression, the economic en- 
vironment of the next decade would be marked by inflation. In all countries, 
there had been a deficiency of  investment during the war, and in Europe, in 
addition, there had  been  enormous destruction of  productive facilities. It 
would be difficult to undertake the increased investment necessary for recon- 
struction without  generating  inflationary pressures. Moreover,  because of 
wartime rationing and price control, personal wealth had become excessive 
relative to  prospective income, and this would  result in  a large increase of 
consumer spending in the immediate postwar years. And, as too much of the 
personal savings was  held  in  bank deposits and  war savings bonds, there 
would be a shift in holdings from monetary assets to real assets. This would 
1. U.S.  Department of  State, Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference,  Bretton Woods,  New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1948), 2: 155 1. 
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result in a boom in housing and higher prices for stocks, which represented 
real assets, and a fall in the prices of  bonds, which were monetary assets. 
These views were presented in a research report of the staff and later published 
in the first issue of the Stuf Papers. 
As the International Monetary Fund gave no credence to the danger of the 
recurrence of a great depression, some countries wanted a study of the ques- 
tion by another agency. The United Nations appointed a committee of econo- 
mists from the United States and other countries under the chairmanship of 
Professor James W.  Angell to study the international effects of recessions. The 
Fund presented its view that cyclical fluctuations in the United States would 
be mild and would have a limited effect on the U.S. trade balance. This be- 
came the tenor of the Angell Committee’s report. Nevertheless, the fear of a 
great depression persisted, and, in every recession until that of  1957-58,  the 
Fund had  to reassure its members that it was not the beginning of  a great 
depression and that the U.S. economy would soon resume its growth. 
Exchange Rates and Balance of Payments Adjustment 
Of  more immediate importance, the International Monetary Fund had  to 
prepare for its work on exchange rates and balance of payments problems. In 
October 1946, the Fund asked its members to communicate initial par values 
for their currencies based on the rates of exchange that prevailed sixty days 
before the Fund Agreement came into force. This presented complex theoret- 
ical problems for the staff. How was the Fund to determine whether the initial 
par values were appropriate? In spite of rationing and controls, prices and 
wages had risen considerably during the war and, because of the latent infla- 
tion, were expected to rise further in the next few years. All the European 
members had exchange restrictions and, under the Fund Agreement, were en- 
titled to retain them and  modify them if  necessary in the transition period. 
Under these conditions, it was not possible to apply a purchasing power parity 
test to determine whether the initial par values communicated to the Fund 
were appropriate. 
Instead, the International Monetary Fund decided that the basis for deter- 
mining whether an initial par value was acceptable should be how  it would 
perform the primary function of an exchange rate-that  is, to encourage ex- 
ports and to restrain imports. Because of the acute postwar shortages and the 
need for large resources for reconstruction, it was not possible for the Euro- 
pean members of the Fund to depend solely on the exchange rate to restrain 
imports in the immediate postwar period. As the chairman of the Fund said in 
a talk at Harvard University in February 1948,4 in order to restrain their de- 
3.  Edward M.  Bernstein,  “Latent Inflation: Problems and Policies,” Internutionul Monetary 
4. Camille Gutt’s talk was published as “Exchange Rates and the International Monetary Fund,” 
FundStuffPapers 1, no. 1 (February 1950): 1-16. 
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mand  for imports through the exchange rate,  these countries would  have 
to depreciate their currencies so sharply that  it would reduce their foreign 
exchange earnings because their capacity to produce and to export was still 
limited. 
The Fund decided, therefore, that the best test of the initial par value was 
its effect on exports. Some members whose currencies were grossly overval- 
ued did not communicate par values in  1946. The par values of the currencies 
of a few countries that the Fund approved were expected to last only a year or 
so, as the staff noted. Actually, the initial par values that the Fund approved 
did enable its members to export as much of their output as they could divert 
from domestic consumption and  investment at that time.  The Fund knew, 
however, that the initial par values of the European members would have to be 
changed after a few years-that  is, when their production had recovered and 
they were able to increase their exports. 
By  1949, it had become evident that the European currencies would have to 
be devalued. Although Europe’s production had recovered considerably, ex- 
ports to the United States had fallen by  14 percent. In September 1949, the 
United Kingdom proposed to the Fund that the pound be devalued by  30.5 
percent. That was followed immediately by  proposals for devaluation to the 
same extent by the other European members except Belgium, which proposed 
a much  smaller devaluation, and France, which  simply realigned its cross- 
rates with other European currencies after an earlier unauthorized devaluation 
of the franc exclusively against the dollar. 
The 1949 devaluation of sterling was not excessive. Billions of pounds had 
been accumulated as the counterpart of the military expenditures of the United 
Kingdom in the Middle East and the Far East. Sterling balances were being 
sold for dollars in free markets at a discount from the official rate, thus divert- 
ing sterling area imports from Britain to the United States. The devaluation 
was designed to eliminate the discount on sterling, and in this it was success- 
ful. The devaluation of  most continental European currencies, however, was 
excessive. The exports of these countries to the United States had fallen much 
less than Britain’s, and they did not have the problem of  large foreign-held 
balances of  their currencies. They decided to devalue their currencies pre- 
cisely as much as sterling mainly because they regarded the United Kingdom 
as their principal competitor in world trade. This was much the same policy 
as they had followed after World War I, when the dollar rates for the Nether- 
lands guilder, the Swiss franc, and the Swedish krona were allowed to depre- 
ciate about as much as sterling and then to rise to parity along with sterling in 
1925, just before the United Kingdom returned to the gold standard. 
There was another reason why the continental European countries proposed 
such a large devaluation of their currencies. Although fear of a recurrence of 
a great depression had subsided somewhat, a new rationalization of a perma- 
nent dollar shortage had emerged-that,  since World War  I, productivity had 
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this caused the United States to generate a large and persistent surplus in its 
balance of payments on current account. The Fund rejected this view.  The 
dollar shortage, it said, was actually a shortage of real resources for recon- 
struction that would end when Europe’s capacity to produce was restored. The 
Fund approved all the proposed devaluations. It would not have been practical 
to insist on smaller devaluations of the continental European currencies. The 
exchange market would have  said that the European currencies were still 
overvalued as these countries themselves recognized by proposing larger de- 
valuations. 
A related question was how the International Monetary Fund expected the 
devaluations to adjust the balance of payments. Under the classical gold stan- 
dard, adjustment took place more or less automatically as central banks in the 
surplus countries responded to an inflow of  gold by  expanding the money 
supply and central banks in the deficit countries responded to an outflow of 
gold by  contracting the money supply. In this way, surplus and deficit coun- 
tries shared adjustment of  the balance of  payments under the classical gold 
standard in inverse proportion to the size of their monetary economies. As a 
practical matter, there was no other method of adjustment under the classical 
gold standard. The budget was expected always to be in balance, except in 
time of  war, and  debt incurred during the war was expected to be reduced 
gradually after the war.  As the gold value of  the currency was regarded as 
immutable, no responsible country would change the gold parity of  its cur- 
rency in order to deal with a deficit or surplus in its balance of  payments. The 
situation changed after central banks became more active in their management 
of the monetary system. As Keynes emphasized, a deficit country still had to 
follow a restrictive monetary policy in order to avoid further depletion of its 
gold reserves. A surplus country, on the other hand, could neutralize the ex- 
pansionary effect of  a gold inflow through open market operations. 
What was the obligation of a surplus country under the Bretton Woods sys- 
tem? In a document prepared for the Bretton Woods conference, Questions 
and Answers on  the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. Treasury gave its 
view of  what the Fund would recommend to a country whose currency had 
become scarce. The large and persistent surplus, it said, could be due to in- 
adequate domestic demand. In that case, the Fund’s recommendations should 
include changes in credit and investment policy and other measures that would 
help expand economic activity. It was also possible that the increase in pro- 
ductivity had been greater than the rise in wage rates, so that unit labor costs 
have fallen, and an upward adjustment in wages should be encouraged. “In 
extreme cases,” it added, “it may also be desirable to recommend a change in 
exchange rates for the country whose currency is scarce.’15 
5.  Questions and Answers on the International Monetary Fund, in The International Monetary 
Fund, 1945-65,  ed. J. T. Horsefield (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), 
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Regarding deficit countries, the Articles of Agreement said only that the 
Fund’s resources were available to members under adequate safeguards to en- 
able them to correct maladjustments in the balance of payments without re- 
sorting to deflation, which would be  destructive of  national prosperity, or 
resorting to restrictions of trade and payments, which would be destructive of 
international prosperity. In the Questions and Answers on the International 
Monetary Fund, the U.S. Treasury said, “It would be a complete inversion of 
objectives if  a high level of business activity were to be sacrificed in order to 
maintain any given structure of exchange rates.”6  That is why the Fund Agree- 
ment provided that a member could propose a change in the par value of its 
currency if that was necessary to correct a fundamental disequilibrium in its 
balance of payments. 
The discussions before the Bretton Woods conference did not consider how 
the devaluation of a currency could be expected to eliminate a deficit in the 
balance of  payments. After the International Monetary Fund began opera- 
tions, the staff developed its views on balance of  payments adjustment. A 
temporary deficit in the expansion phase of a business cycle is not a payments 
problem. It should be financed out of a member’s own reserves or by drawings 
on the Fund. A large and persistent deficit accompanied by full employment 
is an indication of excessive domestic demand, and the proper remedy is to 
use monetary and fiscal policies to restrain demand. If  the excessive demand 
has been built into the price and cost structure, devaluation of  the currency 
may be necessary. The devaluation by  itself, however, will not eliminate the 
deficit if  the excessive demand is allowed to persist. To  be effective, the de- 
valuation must be accompanied by measures to reduce domestic consumption 
and investment relative to production. These views were later published in the 
Staf Papers. 
Quotas, Drawings, and Reserves 
There were some interesting problems with quotas, drawings, and reserves. 
The International Monetary Fund had resources of  currencies and gold to 
which it referred as a common reserve of its members. Did this common re- 
serve add to the members’ own reserves? As part of a member’s quota sub- 
scription had to be paid in gold, the first effect was a reduction of its own gold 
holdings. In 1947, a member inquired of the Fund whether it could count the 
gold subscription as part of its gold reserves. The reply of the Fund was that 
this would not be proper, as the gold subscribed by  the member belonged to 
the Fund.  This meant that a member’s own reserves were reduced by  the 
amount of its quota subscription paid in gold. 
A related problem arose from the Fund’s transactions with its members. 
The U.S. balance of  payments, as published by the Commerce Department, 
6.  Ibid., 138 501  Panel Session I 
classified drawings of dollars from the Fund as an outflow of U.S. capital. I 
discussed this with the economists of the Commerce Department, emphasiz- 
ing that drawings from the Fund and repurchases of previous drawings from 
the Fund were transactions in monetary reserves. While drawings of dollars 
resulted in an increase of  U.S. liabilities to foreigners or, if  converted, in a 
decrease of U.S. gold reserves, the offsetting entry should be  not  a capital 
outflow-that  is, foreign investment-but  an increase of other U.S. reserve 
assets in the form of its net position in the Fund. Later, the International Mon- 
etary Fund did treat a member’s net position in the Fund as a reserve asset. 
Even after this change in the classification of the net position in the Fund as 
a reserve asset, drawings of dollars could impair the reserve liquidity of  the 
United States. In principle, surplus countries were expected to finance the 
deficit countries through drawings of their currencies from the Fund. In prac- 
tice, this did not happen. In 1947-60, virtually all the drawings from the Fund 
were in dollars and  sterling, although U.S.  and  U.K. reserves had  not in- 
creased over this period. On the other hand, except for deutsche marks, only 
1.4 percent of the total drawings from the Fund were in continental European 
currencies, although these countries had increased their reserves considerably. 
As these currencies were selling at a premium above par, deficit countries 
could have minimized their service charges (three-fourths of  1 percent) or 
offset them entirely if they had drawn the currencies of the surplus countries 
and sold them for dollars in the exchange market. 
When dollars were drawn from the Fund and used to make payments to 
Europe, the surplus countries could either add the dollars to their foreign ex- 
change reserves or convert the dollars into gold. If they chose to convert the 
dollars, the gold reserves of the United States would be reduced, although its 
total reserves would be unchanged because of the increase in its net position 
in the Fund. The conversion of dollars into gold, however, caused difficulties 
for the United States. Under U.S. legislation, the Federal Reserve Banks had 
to hold gold reserves against their currency and deposit liabilities. In addition, 
in a communication to the Fund, the United States had undertaken to buy and 
sell gold freely in settlement of international transactions, a commitment that 
became more onerous as the gold reserves fell. 
The reserve problem, as it manifested itself at the end of  the 1950s, was 
much less a shortage of  aggregate reserves for the world than a shortage of 
gold reserves for the United States. This did not arise from an adverse balance 
of payments on current account, although net foreign investment began to 
exceed the current account surplus by  1958. U.S. gold reserves were actually 
slightly larger at the end of  1957 than they had been ten years earlier. In spite 
of that, the gold reserves were very close to the minimum required by  U.S. 
legislation. That was because the money supply-currency  plus demand and 
time deposits-had  grown at an average annual rate of just under 3 percent. 
The Treasury met this problem, as it had met the same problem in  1945, by 
having Congress reduce the gold reserve requirements. 502  Edward M. Bernstein 
The problem was intensified by a shift in Europe’s preference for gold over 
dollars. Between  1950 and  1957, Western Europe added $8.0 billion to its 
reserves, about equally divided between gold and dollars. All the increase in 
Europe’s gold reserves came from newly mined gold and gold sales of  the 
Soviet Union, as U.S. gold reserves were not reduced in this period. From 
1957 to 1965, by contrast, Europe’s gold reserves increased by $12.7 billion, 
and its official holdings of  dollars increased by  $4.5 billion. Nearly all the 
increase in Europe’s gold reserves came from the conversion of dollars as U.S. 
gold reserves fell by  $9.0 billion in this period. The Treasury had  no legal 
obligation to convert dollars into gold. It had informed the Fund, however, 
that it would do so under Article IV-4-a as an alternative to the responsibility 
of preventing exchange transactions outside the range prescribed by the Fund. 
The Gold Reserve Problem of  the United States 
The drain on U.S. gold reserves was attributed to a variety of causes. One 
view was that it indicated a shortage of aggregate reserves. Other countries, 
seeking a growth of  reserves to keep pace with the growth of  their interna- 
tional transactions and unable to secure the reserves from newly mined gold 
and gold sales of the Soviet Union, were impelled to meet their reserve needs 
by drawing down U.S. gold reserves. This did not explain the growing pref- 
erence for gold over dollars. Another view was that, at the prewar price of 
$35.00 an ounce, gold was too cheap, and for this reason the equal attractive- 
ness of gold and dollars could not be maintained by raising interest rates, even 
if the United States were willing to follow such a policy. 
The solution advocated by Roy Harrod, Milton Gilbert, and others was to 
raise the price of gold. Article IV-7 of the Fund Agreement provided for uni- 
form changes in par values-that  is, an increase in the price of  gold in  all 
currencies without changing exchange rates. The Bretton Woods Agreements 
Act, the enabling legislation for membership in the Fund, provided that the 
U.S. executive director could not vote for a change in the par value of  the 
dollar or a uniform change in par values without the prior approval of Con- 
gress. In practice, that need not have prevented a change in the price of gold 
as the market would assume that, if other countries agreed to raise the price, 
the United States would have to approve it after a brief delay. 
In  1958, the International Monetary Fund issued the report International 
Reserves and Liquidity.’  In cautious terms, the Fund staff concluded that there 
was no evidence that reserves were inadequate at that time or would become 
inadequate in the next decade. Any country willing to devote real resources to 
acquiring reserves, the report said, would have no difficulty in acquiring all 
the gold and foreign exchange it needed. This is the logical fallacy of compo- 
7.  Inrernarional  Reserves  und Liquidity  (Washington, D.C.: International  Monetary  Fund, 
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sition-that  what is true of  any country taken alone is true of  all countries 
taken together. The fact, of course, was that, while any country could get all 
the gold it was able to pay for, all other countries could not get more than the 
amount of  newly mined gold and gold sales of  the Soviet Union except by 
cannibalizing the gold reserves of the United States. 
The Fund report ignored the reserve problem as it manifested itself in the 
United States. At a seminar at Harvard University in October 1958, I pointed 
out that any substantial increase in the reserves of other countries would im- 
pair the reserve or liquidity position of the United States.8  The Fund report did 
note that “there is always the possibility-slight  though it may be-that  there 
may be a run to convert dollars into gold and sterling into dollars or gold.”9  It 
seemed to me that the United States was at much greater risk than that from 
the increased preference for gold over dollars. My recommendations for deal- 
ing with the reserve problem were as follows. 
1. Increase the Fund quotas of all members substantially and integrate them 
with the working reserves of  members. The United States should treat its 
transactions with the Fund as transactions in monetary reserves. It had a net 
credit balance of $2.0 billion in the Fund in mid-1958, and it should use this 
to draw the currencies of the creditor countries in order to reduce the outflow 
of gold. The premium over the par value for these currencies would more than 
cover the transactions charge of  the Fund-three-fourths  of  1 percent. 
2.  Supplement the larger quotas with contingent resources that would be 
available to the Fund in an emergency. If the Fund could count on substantial 
additional resources over and above the gold and currencies subscribed by its 
members, it could meet very serious problems that might arise, including a 
run on the reserve centers. The best way to be assured of these supplementary 
resources would be for the Fund to issue three-year debentures and to have the 
great trading countries agree to acquire stated amounts under certain condi- 
tions. 
Some of  these recommendations were included in  the General Arrange- 
ments to Borrow that the Fund made with the Group of Ten. However, this did 
not prevent the intensification of the gold problem of the United States, which 
had multiple causes. One arose from the new pattern of price behavior. Under 
the gold standard, a prolonged rise of  prices, inflation, was ultimately fol- 
lowed by  deflation. In the new monetary system, a prolonged rise of  prices 
was usually followed by  a period of  stability, but the inflation was never re- 
versed. This was a better system for maintaining a high level of  output and 
employment, but it was not one in which a country could continue to convert 
its currency into gold at a price fixed in 1934. 
The United States made the mistake of believing that it was on a gold stan- 
8. Copies of  this paper-“International  Monetary Reserves for  an  Expanding World  Econ- 
omy”-are  available in the  libraries of  the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., and the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (MS EMB[LTD] 58/13). 
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dard when it was not willing to abide by gold standard rules. The Gold Re- 
serve Act of  1934 defined the dollar in terms of gold and authorized the Trea- 
sury to issue regulations under which it would buy and sell gold. The Treasury 
established the policy of selling gold for dollars at $35.00 an ounce plus one- 
fourth of  1 percent to those central banks that agreed to sell gold to the Trea- 
sury at this price minus one-fourth of 1 percent. When the International Mon- 
etary Fund began operations, the United States informed it that U.S. policy 
was to buy and sell gold freely in settlement of  international transactions to 
fulfill its responsibility under Article IV. In addition to undertaking these ob- 
ligations, the United States joined a pool of leading members of the Fund that 
sold gold in London in order to maintain the free market price at about the 
official price. Although the United States was only one of several countries in 
the Gold Pool, it actually provided all the gold sold in the free market, as the 
other countries repurchased from the United States the gold they supplied to 
the Pool. 
Although the United States assumed these obligations-the  only member 
of  the Fund to do so-it  nevertheless followed policies that ignored those 
traditionally associated with the gold standard. When the gold reserve fell, as 
it did in 1941-45  and after 1957, the United States did not reduce the money 
supply. Instead, it changed the gold reserve requirements twice and finally 
abolished them entirely. Besides, the United States resorted to subterfuges to 
exaggerate its gold holdings by inducing the International Monetary Fund to 
invest some of its gold in U.S. Treasury bills and later to place gold deposits 
with the United States to offset gold sales associated with the increase of quo- 
tas. The United States did not raise interest rates to stem the outflow of gold. 
Instead, it imposed an interest equalization tax on U.S. purchases of foreign 
securities and placed other restrictions on U.S. foreign investment. None of 
these devices could stop the gold drain. At  last, in  1971, the United States 
recognized that its gold policy was a failure. It notified the Fund that it no 
longer bought and sold gold freely and terminated the gold convertibility of 
the dollar. The monetary system created at Bretton Woods lasted twenty-five 
years. That is how long it  took to deplete the gold reserves of  the United 
States. 
Why Did the Bretton Woods System 
Break Down?  W.  Max Corden 
Various explanations for the breakdown of Bretton Woods have been advanced 
at the conference and in the massive earlier literature. It all seems rather con- 
W.  Max Corden is professor of  international economics at Johns Hopkins University, School of 
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fusing. Can they all be true? Broadly, they can be classified under the head- 
ings of  “liquidity,” “adjustment,” and “confidence,” but  there are subcases 
among these. 
For the purpose of this discussion, I focus on the Bretton Woods system as 
a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates. It is this that broke down in 
August 1971 and was the principal feature. As noted by Michael Bordo (chap. 
1 in this volume), the system had evolved as almost a fixed rate system with- 
out exchange rate adjustments. But it is still true that exchange rates were 
perceived as “adjustable,” this being the reason for the speculative develop- 
ments. In addition, the Bretton Woods system was conceived of  as a gold- 
dollar system, the convertibility of  dollars into gold supposedly creating a 
discipline for the United States and thus making the system “symmetrical.” 
But this aspect was effectively ended in 1968, and it is doubtful that this dis- 
cipline ever really operated. Other aspects, of course, were also important and 
have lasted, notably the general establishment of  convertibility of  one cur- 
rency into another for current account transactions. The fact that the Bretton 
Woods institutions still exist, doing certain other work for which they were 
also originally intended, or doing new work, is also worth noting. 
The Liquidity Problem 
It is true that Robert Triffin predicted the breakdown of the system.’ But it 
did not happen the way he predicted. The prediction was that, in the process 
of growth, the non-U.S. world would want more liquidity, and eventually the 
United States would decline to supply it. The shortage of liquidity would then 
generate import restrictions and deflation. 
In  fact,  the .United States passively  supplied all the liquidity the world 
wanted. Depres, Kindleberger, and Salant’s explanation was, in my view, the 
correct one? the United States was meeting the world need for a banker who 
lent long and borrowed short. Countries that absorbed the extra liquidity had 
the option of appreciating their currencies and expanding domestic demand, 
but chose not to do so. Germany and France claimed that they did not want to 
accumulate dollars to the extent that they did, but chose not to take the neces- 
sary and available steps to fulfill their alleged desire. In fact, there was an 
adjustment problem to which I turn below, not a liquidity problem. 
Suppose that the price of gold had been raised in terms of all currencies, or, 
alternatively, suppose that the stock of  gold of  the United  States had been 
miraculously augmented. Would other countries have been happy to exchange 
their interest-bearing dollars into gold? Here the answer must surely be nega- 
tive, provided we make a crucial assumption: that the price of gold was not 
expected to increase further. I shall return to that assumption shortly. The 
1. See Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
2. See Emil Depres, Charles Kindleberger, and Walter Salant, “The Dollar and World Liquidity: 
1960). 
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main point I wish to make is that, given that assumption, it was certainly not 
optimal for countries or individuals to switch out of dollars into gold. Further- 
more, it is worth stressing that, since 1973, there has certainly been no decline 
in the willingness to hold dollar reserves even though dollars are not convert- 
ible into gold. 
It may be argued that, in 1971, there was pressure to convert dollars into 
gold and that, as Michael Bordo (chap. 1 in this volume) has noted, the deci- 
sion to end gold convertibility was triggered by French and British intentions 
to convert their dollars (or require gold guarantees for their dollar holdings). 
It might be said that, if only the U.S. gold stock had been larger, there would 
have been no need to shut the gold window, and so no breakdown. 
But we had here a confidence, not a liquidity, problem. The desire to switch 
out of  dollars into gold resulted from the belief that the dollar price of gold 
might rise. Would that belief have been different if the United States had had 
more gold? Possibly. In that case, one might say that the confidence problem 
was caused by the liquidity problem. More important, suppose that there had 
not been a preoccupation with the Triffin problem; would there then have been 
a desire to switch from dollars to gold? I doubt it. It is not the Triffin problem, 
but the belief in the Triffin problem, that caused the pr~blem!~ 
On balance, I conclude that there was not a liquidity problem at all. The 
essential reason why there was no such problem was the one advanced by 
Depres, Kindleberger, and Salant, namely, that the international capital mar- 
ket met the liquidity needs. There was no need to create special drawing rights 
(SDRs). They were created, yet the system broke down. It might be said that, 
while the SDR system was created, sufficient SDRs were not issued. But the 
reason they were not issued was that it was clearly seen that there was not a 
liquidity problem. The problem was the opposite: too much liquidity, leading 
to inflati~n.~ 
The Adjustment Problem 
~cribed,~  although the second is the more popular one. 
Here there are two kinds of explanations, to the first of which I have sub- 
3. These are my words, but a conversation with Robert Solomon led me to them. 
4. I am persuaded by de Grauwe’s discussion of the Triffin problem and of what actually hap- 
pened (see Paul de Grauwe, International Money: Post-  War Trends and Theories [New York 
Oxford University F’ress,  19891, 23-30).  The dramatic increase in U.S.  dollar liabilities (and 
hence the decline in the U.S. liquidity ratio) that began in the late 1960s and became a flood in 
1970 and 1971 did not result from a conversion of dollars into gold by central banks, as predicted 
by the Triffin analysis. (Indeed, from 1966 to 1969, the gold holdings of the other central banks 
actually fell, the result of  sales in the private gold market,  and after that they stayed roughly 
constant.) Rather, it resulted from the confidence problem discussed below. The potential Triffin 
dilemma was solved, in de Grauwe’s view, by the creation of SDRs-and  thus would not have led 
to the breakdown of the system. 
5. See W.  Max Corden, Infirion, Exchange Rates and the World Economy (Chicago: Univer- 
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1. The Bretton Woods system allowed for adjustment in circumstances of 
“fundamental disequilibrium.” It was, after all, not constituted as a fixed ex- 
change rate system, although it may have evolved that way. Countries chose 
not to adjust. In a symmetrical system, the United States could have adjusted 
by  devaluing (raising the dollar price of  gold), while other countries could 
depreciate or appreciate as appropriate, subject to IMF approval (which they 
always obtained when they sought it). Once the system clearly evolved into a 
dollar standard, there was no need for the United States to take the initiative. 
But, since exchange rates are relative, the other major countries could have 
appreciated and so, effectively, devalued the dollar. 
The question, then, is why the exchange rate adjustment option was for- 
gone. There were two reasons. The first was that countries (notably Germany) 
did not wish to appreciate because of concern for their export industries. Im- 
plicitly, at least, they were willing to accumulate dollars-even  though they 
claimed that they did not want them-for  the sake of  the export interests. 
Eventually, the dollar accumulation would lead to more domestic inflation, 
which would indeed bring about some real appreciation, but not as much as if 
nominal appreciation had prevented the dollar accumulation. Furthermore, 
the United States did not wish to devalue (raise the price of  gold) because, 
among other reasons, other countries were expected to follow. In other words, 
because of concern for their export industries, other counties would not allow 
their currencies to appreciate relative to the dollar. 
Second, countries avoided devaluations because of the expectation that this 
might  create  of  further  devaluations,  thus  generating  further  speculation 
against the currency. Possibly, the concern with prestige-devaluation  hurting 
prestige-may  have been a separate factor, but, in the main, the preoccupa- 
tion with prestige was simply a manifestation of this concern for the effects on 
expectations. For example, if  the British government had felt in 1964 that it 
could  devalue without generating further speculation against the pound,  it 
might well have done so. But this was the confidence problem, to which I 
come later. This factor also played some part in explaining reluctance to ap- 
preciate since appreciation might stimulate further capital inflows. 
The breakdown in August 1971 resulted from a determined attempt by the 
U.S. authorities to bring about real devaluation of the dollar to improve U.S. 
competitiveness, which had been eroded. It could have happened within the 
system if other countries had been more cooperative, appreciating their cur- 
rencies sufficiently relative to gold while the dollar price of gold stayed un- 
changed, or agreeing to maintain their gold par values if  the United States 
devalued the dollar. This motive for the events of  1971 has been stressed by 
Fred Bergsten (see his remarks in chap. 13), and the argument seems persua- 
sive to me. The aim was, essentially, to force adjustment. The concern was 
not primarily with the accumulation of dollar assets by foreigners but with the 
competitiveness of U. S. export- and import-competing industries. 
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on countries other than the United States for failing to operate the system 
properly by adjusting appropriately at intervals. 
2.  The  second approach to  the  adjustment problem blames the United 
States. The monetary and fiscal expansion of the United States generated the 
fundamental disequilibrium that created the need to adjust. The alternative to 
adjustment was that other countries had to absorb a flood of dollars. One could 
then argue as follows. The United States created the disequilibrium in the first 
place; had it not done so, there would have been no adjustment problem. But 
other countries failed to adjust in response to the disequilibrium. Had they 
adjusted-as  they could have done within the system-there  would also have 
been no adjustment problem. There was thus a “partnership in crime.” With- 
out this partnership, the system would not have broken down. 
There are two important qualifications to this “partnership” view. The first 
fixes the blame firmly on the United States. In this view,  adjustment to the 
U.S.  expansion was not comparable to adjustment to other kinds of  shocks 
and more country-specific developments. The United States was at the center 
of  the system. It was  unreasonable to expect numerous countries to appre- 
ciate-and  to expect them to do so in a timely fashion even when the full 
nature of the developments was not understood and a fixed exchange rate habit 
had developed. Furthermore, the surplus countries would have had to appre- 
ciate collectively since, if any one of them did on its own, it would lose com- 
petitiveness relative to the others. Thus, the U.S. expansion did put the system 
under an exceptional degree of strain. To  that extent, special blame attaches 
to U.S. policies. Given that the system had evolved into a dollar standard, the 
United States had  an obligation to maintain conservative monetary policies 
that would avoid the need for many other countries to appreciate relative to 
the dollar. 
The second qualification is that there was also a need for adjustment for 
reasons other than U.S. fiscal and monetary expansion. Because of differential 
productivity developments, the U.S. real exchange rate did need to depre- 
ciate, and (as Paul Krugman pointed out at the conference), this real deprecia- 
tion since 1973 has stuck. More generally, there will always be a need for 
adjustment. And, if  there is a sustained reluctance to adjust, the system will 
eventually break down because of the confidence problem. Presumably, if  the 
system had not broken down finally in March 1973 as a result of  the expan- 
sionary U.S. policies, it would have done so later as a result of  the first oil 
shock and its consequences and, if not then, in the early 1980s. 
The Confidence Problem 
By  now  it will be evident that, in my  view,  the fundamental cause of  the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods was the confidence problem. In other words, a 
system of fixed but occasionally adjusted exchange rates is incompatible with 
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tually to forced devaluations or a need to let rates float. Because of leads and 
lags and the opportunity for capital movements between different parts of 
multinational companies, it presents problems even when there are compre- 
hensive exchange controls. The system had to break down for that reason. As 
Richard Cooper has said, (in his Comment on Bordo, chap. 1 in this volume), 
it was “fundamentally flawed.” Williamson wrote, “The adjustable peg broke 
down because it did not provide a viable crisis-free method of changing ex- 
change rates in an era of capital mobility.”6 The reluctance to devalue within 
the rules of the system-the  concern with prestige-was  explained by  an at- 
tempt at commitment, to avoid loss of  confidence. The number one culprit 
was the growing and increasingly efficient international capital market. 
The confidence or speculation problem could have been avoided by  fre- 
quent small exchange adjustments. This could have taken the form either of a 
“crawling peg”-already  proposed by Williamson7-or  of more intermittent 
small realignments as in the early phase of the EMS. Alternatively, firm com- 
mitments to regimes of permanently fixed exchange rates would have had to 
be made-if  such commitments could have been  made credible. While in 
both cases it would not have broken down dramatically and become trans- 
formed into a floating rate system, it would no longer have been the Bretton 
Woods system. 
The Perspective of Policymakers  Robert Solomon 
I shall focus on the views of policymakers, abroad as well as in the United 
States, on exchange rates, international liquidity, and international monetary 
reform under the Bretton Woods system. 
Exchange Rates 
In  reaction  to  the  competitive depreciations of  the  1930s, the  Bretton 
Woods Agreement provided that members of the IMF had to get its permission 
to alter their par values and that such changes were to take place only when a 
“fundamental disequilibrium” existed. The Agreement did not define funda- 
mental disequilibrium. 
While IMF members were committed to having par values and to keeping 
their currencies within a narrow range around those par values, the system 
was not expected by  the founding fathers to be one of  fixed exchange rates. 
Robert Solomon is a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution. 
6. John Williamson, The Failure of  World Monetary Reform, 1971-74  (New York: New York 
7. See John Williamson, The Crawling Peg, Princeton Essays in International Finance, no. 50 
University Press, 1977). 51. 
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And it was not a fixed-rate system in its operation. A number of alterations of 
par values occurred, not only among developing countries, but also among 
industrial nations: a general downward move of most European currencies in 
1949, two French devaluations in 1957-58,  a small appreciation by Germany 
and the Netherlands in 1961, the British devaluation of November 1967, and 
another German revaluation and French devaluation in 1969. 
But policymakers regarded most of  these exchange-rate adjustments as ab- 
errations. And they usually occurred in an atmosphere of crisis. In countries 
with deficits, the need to devalue was viewed as a policy failure and a political 
setback. The most dramatic instance of this attitude was General de Gaulle’s 
refusal to lower the value of the franc in 1968 after an international meeting at 
which there appeared to be a consensus that France would depreciate. Less 
than a year later, his successor carried out the devaluation. 
The United States was in a unique position. It was the only country that was 
not expected to maintain a par value in terms of other currencies; instead, it 
stood ready to convert official holdings of  its currency into gold for foreign 
monetary authorities. And  countries around the world held their reserves in 
dollars on the assumption that the dollar price of gold would remain fixed at 
$35.00 per ounce. In the view of American policymakers, if the official gold 
price were to be raised-which  a dollar devaluation implied-those  countries 
with official dollar reserves would no longer be willing to hold them. They 
would cash in their dollars for gold, and the U.S. gold reserve would be de- 
pleted.  The result would  be  that  the gold exchange standard would break 
down. The analogy was with a bank: if it were to reduce the value of deposi- 
tors’ claims,  a run on the bank would follow. While many countries were 
reluctant to have their currencies depreciate under the Bretton Woods system, 
the United States had this special reason for avoiding an overt depreciation of 
the dollar. 
If the dollar had to remain fixed relative to gold, the United States could not 
alter its exchange rate. This created a problem when the U.S. balance of pay- 
ments-especially  the current account-weakened,  as it did at the end of the 
1950s and again, under the impact of the Vietnam War, in the late 1960s. The 
only way to bring about a downward adjustment of the dollar was for other 
countries to agree to appreciate their exchange rates. U.S. policymakers were 
thus in favor of appreciations and generally opposed to depreciations of other 
major currencies. The most striking example of this attitude was the enormous 
American effort-ultimately  unsuccessful-to  help  the  British  authorities 
stave off sterling devaluation in 1964-67. 
The appreciation option was not looked on with  favor by  European and 
Japanese policymakers. They did not want to be in the position of bailing out 
the United States whenever it had a balance-of-payments problem. Or, to put 
it differently, they wanted to maintain “discipline” on the United States. They 
believed that,  if  they stood ready to upvalue their currencies whenever the 
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would feel free to pursue policies that were too expansionary and therefore 
too inflationary, that is, to engage in “benign neglect” of the balance of  pay- 
ments. 
The balance of payments was, and perhaps still is, a much more important 
discipline on domestic policies in Europe than in the United States. European 
policymakers, except for those in Germany, believed that the only  way  to 
make restrictive fiscal and monetary policies palatable to their citizens was 
to invoke the balance of payments. They tended to impute the same mind-set 
to the United States even though that is mistaken. This was a major reason 
why they were unwilling to agree to appreciations of their currencies relative 
to the dollar. 
In that asymmetrical situation, U.S. policymakers were in a box. The dollar 
price of  gold could not be changed without bringing down the system. And 
therefore the United States could not achieve a depreciation of its overvalued 
currency without first abandoning gold  convertibility, as was  finally done 
twenty years ago last August. 
International Liquidity 
While all industrial country currencies were convertible after  1958, the 
United States undertook a special type of convertibility. 
The  belief  of  European  policymakers,  referred  to  earlier,  concerning 
balance-of-payments discipline on domestic policies, was  closely related to 
their attitude toward convertibility. They believed that it was only the Ameri- 
can fear of losing gold reserves that acted as a constraint on American poli- 
cies. Thus, some European central banks did not accumulate dollars when in 
overall balance-of-payments surplus; rather, they converted dollars beyond 
working balances into gold at the U. S. Treasury. 
The Bretton Woods system made no explicit provision for increasing coun- 
tries’ international reserves in a growing world economy, aside from a gener- 
alized increase in the price of gold, which the United States could not agree 
to, as I have argued. The amount of  newly mined gold that moved into re- 
serves was rather small ($300 million per year in 1952-69).  A more important 
source of new reserves was the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments. 
This situation led to Robert Triffin’s famous dilemma: if  the U.S. balance- 
of-payments deficit were eliminated, other countries would be  deprived of 
additions to reserves; but if that source of new reserves continued, instability 
might arise as U.S. reserve liabilities rose relative to its reserve assets. 
The way to resolve this dilemma was to create a new international reserve 
asset. And that led to the special drawing right (SDR). It is worth recalling 
that, in the four years leading up to the first SDR allocation at the beginning 
of  1970, the United States did not add at all to world reserves. In 1969, when 
the decision was made, distributing the new reserve asset appeared justified. 
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on the new reserve asset as a supplement to existing reserves, while many 
Europeans wished to see it as a substitute for dollars. 
Reforming the System 
Two reform efforts were conducted in the period up to 1971. A new inter- 
national reserve asset-the  SDR-was  created after lengthy study and nego- 
tiations beginning in  1962. Then, in the late  1960s, an effort was  made to 
introduce greater flexibility of  exchange rates without abandoning the  par 
value system. 
The basic asymmetry built into the Bretton Woods  system, and attitudes 
toward that asymmetry, help explain the outcomes of those reform efforts. 
All the variants of greater exchange-rate flexibility had to assume that the 
dollar would remain fixed-that  the United States would be passive with re- 
spect to its exchange rate. The policymakers of  Europe and Japan were not 
sympathetic to an approach embodying that asymmetry. Thus, that reform 
failed. 
On the other hand, the SDR negotiations did succeed in  creating a new 
international reserve asset, partly because that reform appeared to move the 
system toward greater symmetry. A new reserve asset, created by the IMF and 
bearing  the  signature of  no  country,  was  acceptable  both  to  the  United 
States-which  saw a global need for additional reserves-and  to other coun- 
tries, which believed that the new asset would lessen reliance of the system on 
the U.S. dollar. 